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The Brown Bess in combat- how effective was it ?

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Watching movies like The Patriot ( yea I know) and others I've oft wondered how effective the Brown Bess musket was in actual combat as used by the British. Was it capable of combat accuracy in the hands of the common British soldier on the firing line ? In fact, how effect was volley fire from a smoothbore on the battle field ? I can imagine that lead ball quite capable of doing a lot of damage if it hit the target- did it ?

gU58d3Ah.jpg
 
Ask the French soldiers at Waterloo.

Accuracy of course was so-so. But the large bore diameter and robust lock made it very reliable. With lots of volley fire, and the ability of the British infantryman to reload quickly added to the effectivity of the Brown Bess.

It was not until the Continental soldier had the training to match the firepower of the British Infantry Line did the Continental Soldier have the ability to overcome a British Infantry line. The Continental Infantry line used a smooth bored musket.

It wasn't the failure of the Brown Bess that led to the British loss at New Orleans. It was bad tactics across a difficult field that gave advantage to American infantry.
 
In conventional British weapons drills there were orders for everything from return your rammer and prime your piece to Present and Fire. There was no command for Aim. Aiming takes time. The British soldier was trained to get off 3 or 4 shots a minute. Now a Regiment of 1,000 soldiers firing 4 shots a minute are going to produce a hail of lead. However, many of the troops were probably shooting too high. Often military leaders didn't want to waste money on live fire. So troops rarely got to shoot at a mark.

Now that being said, that was the Line or Hat troops that were extensively trained in volley fire. The Light troops, the little guys that were used as flankers and scouts may have learned to aim since they were in situations where it was handy to be able to hit what you aim at.

The British Army while in the Colonies dealing with the insurrection did institute aimed fire training.

In the case of Rogers Rangers it becomes more interesting. There are some indications that they may have carried 2 or 3 kinds of loads. Standard Cartridge for serious work. Buck shot for close up and patched round ball for accuracy. Buck shot could also be added to a cartridge to increase effectiveness.

From my own experience shooting a Pedersoli Bess Carbine. I can hit a man sized target at 50 to 60 yards 8 out of 10 times. At 100 yards maybe 3 out of 10 shots.
 
The Brown Bess was as effective as it needed to be.

Easy to load, easy to fire, used a bayonet.

The British were not so worried about things like accuracy, their battlefield tactics were geared toward positions their troops for the most potential damage and then bayonet charges.

Where the Brown Bess was not so useful was when its firepower needed to be relied on in a siege situation.

the battle of Carillon, French muskets fired at 80-100 yards were much sharper and accurate, at volley the British were cut down before the Brown Bess could be utilized.

The battle of Bunker hill, same issue but with a British Victory at a cost. Americans were armed with calibers ranging from .65-.80 firing down upon the British, the British couldn’t reasonably hit their targets firing up hill.

The battle of New Orleans, same as the battle of Carillon the British couldn’t get close enough on the field of fire before canon fire and musket fire riddled and reduced their ranks.

In the open field, the Brown Bess was a masterful weapon to have in the ranks. Battles like Culloden, Long Island, Camden all showed how effective tactics with the Brown Bess could capture the field and intimidate the enemy. Even at Saratoga, the Brown Bess has much success in the hands of American Troops.
 
Waterloo and Gettysburg has roughly the same amount of men on the field. And had about the same number of causulties.
And looking back to battles like Naseby and Blenheim saw about the same percentage.
 
I highly recommend Matthew Spring's "With Zeal and With Bayonet Only." He is the recognized expert on the 18th century British army in North America. One of the myths the author dispels is that in 18th century warfare there was often massed volley fire from two sides standing 40 yards away (a la "The Patriot). Anyone who's shot a reproduction musket knows that the casualty numbers would have been horrendously high were that the case. It wasn't musket ineffectiveness that let to relatively low casualty numbers during AWI battles, but a number of things, including the fact that commanders in general were very reasonably hesitant to engage an enemy without a marked advantage.

There are additional reasons that space doesn't allow, but logistics and manpower played into it. There is also the tactical realities. For example, in eastern North America, the British understood the terrain was broken up by endless stone fences, hills, rivers, and trees. Quite different from the open fields of battle in continental Europe. Infantry in Europe (think Napoleonic tactics) had to use close ordered formations out of necessity to protect them from heavy cavalry. The British adopted loose ordered, quick moving formations during the French and Indian War and again during the AWI. Neither the British nor the Continentals were stupid enough to slowly march perpendicularly within 40 yards of each other. The ideal in 18th century warfare was to maneuver as quickly as possible to outflank your opponent, move into line of battle, and unleash an enfilade fire. If that could be achieved, the proceeding shock of a bayonet charge would most certainly win the field of battle. As somewhat of an aside, you'll have to read the book, but Spring totally changed my perception of Bunker/Breeds Hill. Suffice it to say, Howe wasn't as dumb as we make him out to be.

Period accounts demonstrate that armies engaged at much longer ranges than Barry Lyndon and the Patriot show, often out of the inexperience of soldiers who opened fire too early, but also out of necessity due to the speed at which troops were trying to outflank eachother. The accounts of musket fire from closer than 80 yards show that it was quite deadly - fog of war notwithstanding.

Another great source to check out is kabinettskriege.blogspot.com.
 
Movies, or even very good documentaries are limited as to what you can capture in the shot. Even maps can be tough. Knowing the scale of the map is easy, but it’s still in the palm of your hand. A map of Waterloo or Gettysburg with all those red and blue lines drawn on often represents twenty to thirty square miles
Walking a battlefield you get a better understanding.
The Brits during the war were handicapped at first with the thought that the sight of the red line and a whiff of grape would be enough to scatter a bunch of farmers with pitch forks. Then they faced the fact that had the British won they would have to rule the people as English subjects. They couldn’t just slaughter Willy-nilly.
The rebels were handicapped by small army And commanders that were grossly inexperienced. They could not absorb large causulties.
And finally just a few supporters. Adams thought that two thirds of the country didn’t support the glorious cause.
Neither side could take a Waterloo. ‘A few more victories such as this we shall be ruined’
 
The engineering estimate was that a musket ball would be wounding or fatal out to 300 yards which was the basis for the distance known as 'within musket shot'. Beyond that a ball has lost enough energy to probably only cause minor wounds or notable bruises. The 'spent ball'.
 
That's kind of what I assumed, something as big and slow moving as a musket ball would wreak havoc no matter what it ran into. That said I still don't understand volley fire'. Particularly vs aimed fire and I can't wrap my mind around what the thought behind it was should your opponent not, you know, stand still.

The engineering estimate was that a musket ball would be wounding or fatal out to 300 yards which was the basis for the distance known as 'within musket shot'. Beyond that a ball has lost enough energy to probably only cause minor wounds or notable bruises. The 'spent ball'.
 
Volley fire is some related to the modern spray and pray engagement with an enemy.

The cost of training someone to fire a musket, especially one without a sight, was difficult enough with out teaching the recruit to aim. Besides, it was considered murder if one aimed at a particular target. If a unit would all fire at one time, that put a lot of rounds downrange. The command to fire was given when the muskets were level. Works pretty good for level ground and all sorts of strategies were planned to rotate units that were firing to provide an almost constant rain of lead balls upon an enemy. It was also similar to the enfilade tactic used by archers to launch flights of arrows into lines of approaching enemy. The arrows were launched at an angle to match the range of the approaching line of infantry.
 
With sincere respect to FlinterNick,

At the battle of Carillon, the French were firing from entrenched positions. This while British Forces, including the 42nd Royal Highland Regiment were basically thrown forward as a "Forlorn Hope" by a totally incompetent General Abercrombie. During such charges, British Forces did not usually fire their muskets, so they were exposed to fire without being able to return it. Abercrombie completely ignored using field artillery in support and using flanking attacks or ANY tactic that would have stood a much better chance of success. The "Auld Forty Twa" lost over half of the Regiment in that attack and other British Forces also had high casualities. Not the fault of the Brown Bess, nor the British fighting men.

Actually, the Battle of Breed's Hill (Bunker Hill) was an almost "Deja Vu" reenactment less than 2 decades later, when British Forces were again thrown by their incompetent Officers, against a much less competent, but entrenched American Army . Had the Americans not run out of ammunition and even lacking bayonets, it is quite probable the British would not have captured Breed's Hill on that day - though they would have captured it later with different tactics.

At the Battle of New Orleans, the American Army again used barricaded/entrenched positions. Some British Forces on the flank had success, but with the break down of command and lack of effective artillery and logistics support (they forgot their scaling ladders), it was another significant loss. However, this time the Americans REALLY cheated. The Artillery Regulars of the 7th Regiment did fearsome damage to the attacking British Forces. Battle reports of the period credit the Artillery with more damage done to the British, than any other single arm.

"Artillery lends dignity to what would otherwise be an uncivilized brawl."

Gus
 
Volley fire is some related to the modern spray and pray engagement with an enemy.

The cost of training someone to fire a musket, especially one without a sight, was difficult enough with out teaching the recruit to aim. Besides, it was considered murder if one aimed at a particular target. If a unit would all fire at one time, that put a lot of rounds downrange. The command to fire was given when the muskets were level. Works pretty good for level ground and all sorts of strategies were planned to rotate units that were firing to provide an almost constant rain of lead balls upon an enemy. It was also similar to the enfilade tactic used by archers to launch flights of arrows into lines of approaching enemy. The arrows were launched at an angle to match the range of the approaching line of infantry.

Two main problems with Volley Firing.

The first is not often thought about and that is the soldiers were trained to JERK their triggers to get those "nice and crisp" volleys that sounded like one huge shot. When one JERKS a trigger and doesn't aim LOWER, many volleys flew right over the heads of their opponents.

The other problem was the clouds of blackpowder smoke. Regulars were trained to load quickly and before the smoke would dissipate. Inexperienced or incompetent Officers would order more volley fires before the smoke cleared. Again, with a huge number of misses as the result.

The GREAT thing about Arrows were there were no clouds to impair seeing where the arrows landed. Trained English Archers and competent Officers could then use them to great effectiveness.

Gus
 
This makes a lot of sense to me. I could be entirely mistaken but it seems to me volley fire can only marginally be effective if your opponent is fighting the same way.
How could early Colonial generals see this as a good idea ?

Two main problems with Volley Firing.

The first is not often thought about and that is the soldiers were trained to JERK their triggers to get those "nice and crisp" volleys that sounded like one huge shot. When one JERKS a trigger and doesn't aim LOWER, many volleys flew right over the heads of their opponents.

The other problem was the clouds of blackpowder smoke. Regulars were trained to load quickly and before the smoke would dissipate. Inexperienced or incompetent Officers would order more volley fires before the smoke cleared. Again, with a huge number of misses as the result.

The GREAT thing about Arrows were there were no clouds to impair seeing where the arrows landed. Trained English Archers and competent Officers could then use them to great effectiveness.

Gus
 
Think about a company on line. Eighty men in two lines shoulder to shoulder. It’s a front about sixty feet wide and every fifteen to twenty seconds they will send out a wall of lead.
So your commander op for. You bring up your line. ‘Fix bayonet‘ you command then ready to fire, fire then ‘at the double at the ready advance!’ Your a hundred yards away and inflict five percent causulties while you accept the same number. Your seventy six men charge against the enemies seventy six. At about ten yards away the defenders fire a second volley.
Nothing aimed, just volley fire. How ready is your company now to go Mano a mano at push of bayonet?
 
Hi,
You need to read "Firepower: Weapons Effectiveness on the Battlefield, 1630-1850" by Major-General B. P. Hughes. The Bess was effective in volley fire but not just in terms of the front line subjects aimed at. There were hits deeper in the ranks behind the front rank. Nonetheless, it is remarkable how many shots missed. When you tally casualties per soldiers involved, the numbers are trivial compared with the American Civil War. The shock weapons in the 18th century were artillery and the bayonet, with a minor shout out to cavalry. Now, I want folks to understand something very simple. While firing from behind walls and forts is effective on defense, it is useless for offense. To take a position, you had to mass firepower, just like today. In the 18th century, each soldier had firepower limited to a slow loading, single shot weapon. To mass firepower, you had to mass men. In the 18th century, actually up until WW2, you had no way to control your army except by drums, flags, bugles, or personal commands. Even in WW1, field telephones only communicated to your troops within your lines. Once you stepped out toward the enemy, you were on your own. As such, you had to keep your men together because dispersed squads would be out of your control. As a result from the 17th century to the early 20th, to take the offensive, you massed men in big lines and dense formations and accepted the slaughter. You had no choice unless you only fought defensively.

dave
 
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This makes a lot of sense to me. I could be entirely mistaken but it seems to me volley fire can only marginally be effective if your opponent is fighting the same way.
How could early Colonial generals see this as a good idea ?

One Colonial Colonel, John Stark of New Hampshire, learned to think "outside the box" while a junior Officer with Rogers Rangers during the FIW. At Breed's Hill when he came up to reinforce American Colonel Prescott, Prescott was so happy to see him and knew of Stark's competence, that Prescott said Stark could set up wherever he thought best. Stark realized the flank was weak, so he set his troops there.

What is not commonly known is Colonel Stark had "Range Stakes" driven into the ground 40 yards in front of his line and strictly forbade any shooting until the British crossed the "stake line." (Stark was NOT a man to have his orders disobeyed and his troops followed the orders exactly.)

The following is otherwise a pretty good account of what happened:

"When the New Hampshire militia arrived, the grateful Colonel Prescott allowed Stark to deploy his men where he saw fit. Stark surveyed the ground and immediately saw that the British would probably try to flank the rebels by landing on the beach of the Mystic River, below and to the left of Bunker Hill. Stark led his men to the low ground between Mystic Beach and the hill and ordered them to "fortify" a two-rail fence by stuffing straw and grass between the rails. Stark also noticed an additional gap in the defense line and ordered Lieutenant Nathaniel Hutchins from his brother William's company and others to follow him down a 9-foot-high (2.7 m) bank to the edge of the Mystic River. They piled rocks across the 12-foot-wide (3.7 m) beach to form a crude defense line. After this fortification was hastily constructed, Stark deployed his men three-deep behind the wall. A large contingent of British with the Royal Welch Fusiliers in the lead advanced towards the fortifications. The Minutemen crouched and waited until the advancing British were almost on top of them, and then stood up and fired as one. They unleashed a fierce and unexpected volley directly into the faces of the fusiliers, killing 90 in the blink of an eye and breaking their advance. The fusiliers retreated in panic. A charge of British infantry was next, climbing over their dead comrades to test Stark's line. This charge too was decimated by a withering fusillade by the Minutemen. A third charge was repulsed in a similar fashion, again with heavy losses to the British. The British officers wisely withdrew their men from that landing point and decided to land elsewhere, with the support of artillery.

Later in the battle, as the rebels were forced from the hill, Stark directed the New Hampshire regiment's fire to provide cover for Colonel Prescott's retreating troops. The day's New Hampshire dead were later buried in the Salem Street Burying Ground, Medford, Massachusetts."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Stark#Bunker_Hill
Most of the American Commanders were either trained as British Officers when they were young or learned warfare on the British Model. Most didn't think outside the box very well. Further, until after Valley Forge, American Soldiers were just not as good as British Regulars. AFTER Valley Forge, they came out as REGULARS and equal to the British, IF properly led by their Officers.

However, it was not until a RIFLEMAN by the name of Daniel Morgan came along and they finally promoted him to Brigadier General late in the war, that someone came up with the right tactics and strategy to whip the British Regulars at their own game and even without much artillery support.

Dan Morgan led the British on a long and exhausting chase, while he marshalled his forces and chose the ground to fight. He then used brilliant "defense in detail" tactics that suckered the British under Tarleton to their destruction at the Battle of Cowpens.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cowpens
Had Morgan been promoted earlier as he should have been, these tactics would have been available sooner to the American Army. Morgan was in intense pain from Sciatica during the Battle, but still got the job done. However, he could go no further afterwards and had to "medically retire" right after the Battle.

General Greene used Morgan's tactics as effectively as possible at the Battle of Guilford Court House not long after Cowpens. Had Cornwallis not had his artillery open fire on his own troops, the British probably would not have won the battle, but it bled the British more than in men and materiel than they could afford. It set the British on their path to defeat at Yorktown.

Gus
 
Hi Gus,
The "Old Waggoner" was a very great tactical commander, offensively and defensively. It is important to note that, although he initially commanded a rifle unit, at Cowpens, he had continentals with muskets, a little cavalry, and militia mostly with muskets but also some rifles. One of his biggest successes was using militia, who tended to run away, in a way that allowed them to be effective soldiers without pressing them too hard. With respect to effectiveness of muskets, Hughes provides data indicating that theoretically, a 500-man battalion firing 2 volleys at an advancing solid line of enemy beginning when they were 100 yards away could result in 500-600 hits from those 1000 shots. However, in reality, that kind of carnage was almost never inflicted because soldiers often tended to shoot high, vision was obstructed with smoke, lines were rankled by opposing fire and artillery, and while the first rank might take a beating, following ranks not so much. That was the idea behind Napoleon's attack in columns. They presented a small front from a distance and unless hammered on their flanks, could charge through a line, breaking it. Hughes states that the principle goal of firing was to disrupt the cohesiveness and determination of the enemy line so it was ripe to be overwhelmed physically and psychologically by a bayonet charge. I really liked your description of Stark's tactics at Breed's Hill. He was another officer who knew how to handle militia. By the way, probably all of the British "light Bobs" approaching Stark were armed with this, not the Brown Bess:
u7r17tM.jpg

The British pattern 1760 light infantry carbine.

dave
 
Ask the French soldiers at Waterloo.

Accuracy of course was so-so. But the large bore diameter and robust lock made it very reliable. With lots of volley fire, and the ability of the British infantryman to reload quickly added to the effectivity of the Brown Bess.

It was not until the Continental soldier had the training to match the firepower of the British Infantry Line did the Continental Soldier have the ability to overcome a British Infantry line. The Continental Infantry line used a smooth bored musket.

It wasn't the failure of the Brown Bess that led to the British loss at New Orleans. It was bad tactics across a difficult field that gave advantage to American infantry.
and don't forget ANDREW JACKSON!!?
 
accuracy--- well why is it when you see period drawings and paintings, oils & watercolors that the BRITISH soldier is pointing his weapon forward and his face / head is always facing to the right? how can he hit anyone shooting like that? that should have some bearing on your query.
 

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