Modern Blackpowder

rubincam said:

Maybe they had a better quality pee back then--no preservatives in food or drink??

Click to expand...

"During the American War, spectacular failures had occurred with both gunpowder and guns --- both being too weak for their intended task.
Since the guns were too weak, it is perhaps fortunate that the powder
was not up to standard, or no doubt the failures would have been even
more dramatic. Nevertheless, these failures had convinced even so
conservative an organization as the Board of Ordnance that something
had to be done about both gunpowder and guns. Two artillery officers
were brought in to the semi-civilian Board administrative system to
rectify the deficiencies of the situation. In charge of the gunpowder
problem was William Congreve."

"...In 1779, as a result of complaints regarding the standard of
gunpowder at Plymouth by Admiral Barrington, he inspected the entire
stock and found only four serviceable barrels in the whole fleet. In
1783 he was placed in charge of the Royal Laboratory, the department of
the Board of Ordnance concerned with gunpowder and ammunition, and as a first duty was tasked by the Master General of the Ordnance to
investigate what was wrong with the gunpowder industry."

"What he found was that there was a great deal wrong with the gunpowder industry at the time. The Board of Ordnance had bought the powder mill at Faversham in Kent from Benjamin Pryce in 1759 in an attempt to lessen its dependence on the civilian powder makers, but had found that the mill under the Board's control was somewhat worse than when under Pryce's control: out of a total production 7,144 barrels in the five years before acquisition, 81% passed proof, while in the succeeding five years, only 64% of 6,973 barrels passed proof........ The powder makers had totally failed to produce adequate supplies in the Seven Years War (1756-63); powder from Waltham Abbey Mill analysed in 1770 had been found grossly deficient in saltpetre (PRO WO 47-76); and in the American War of 1775-83 the powder was 'universally complained of in both the Army and Navy'".

Click to expand...

"Fortunately, Congreve left an account of his activities. This is
contained in two pamphlets (both in the R.A. Library), which he wrote,
entitled "A short account of the improvements in Gunpowder", and "A
statement of facts which have arisen from manufacturing Gunpowder at the Royal Mills since 1783". Taken together, they amount to a record both of what he found and what he did about it. The situation at the time was that the powder makers, who had considerable political influence, had contrived to persuade William Pitt, the Prime Minister, that the Royal Mill at Faversham should be sold to the trade, ending the Board's [Board of Ordnance] involvement in the making of powder, on the grounds that civilian powder makers could make it better and cheaper. On the evidence of the first five years after the Board bought Faversham they were perfectly right. One aspect of Congreve's investigation seems to have been to persuade the government to delay a decision until his
enquiry was completed."

"Congreve's first step was to carry out a series of experiments in the Royal Laboratory which proved that the grain was rotten and would not last, and that the method of proving gunpowder by a vertical eprouvette was not valid. At the same time, as a practical experiment, Congreve collected barrels of every type of gunpowder that he could find and sent it out to the West Indies in the 50-gun 4th Rate "Grampus". The result was vindication of his experiments in the Laboratory: all the powders he sent were examined before dispatch and found to be good; when re-examined after the voyage both the Government and the merchant powders were all spoiled. The merchant powder had formed into unusable lumps varying from 27% to 90% of the barrel. The result would have been in practice a serviceability rate of about 60%. By contrast, the foreign powders, Dutch, Swedish, and Russian, were all perfectly dry, separate and serviceable."

"At the same time, on Congreve's orders, all the powder in the Navy was returned to store and re-examined. It was said at the time that in some major ships there were only ten barrels of powder fit for use. In fact, the examination showed a 64% serviceability rate: not as bad as had been thought, but bad enough, and confirming both the Laboratory and "Grampus" experiments. The last series of experiments had been in 1754 (T. Fortune, "The Artillerist's Companion", 1778, Millan), when out of eleven powders tested comparatively, English cannon powder came eighth. The position seemed to have worsened."

"This was enough to refute the powder makers' claim that as things
stood they could make good powder. Congreve then set about a further
series of experiments in the Royal Laboratory to improve the situation.
He started making gunpowder himself. The then current proportions were
75% saltpetre, 15% charcoal and 10% sulphur. Congreve tried this, a
75,15, 9 mix and various other recipes including the standard French,
Swedish, Hanoverian and Dutch powders. His conclusion was that all the
systems of proportion dealt to the same standard, the 75,15,10 mix was
best. He then started experimenting with methods of manufacture,
particularly grain size, shape and durability."

"In the course of his investigations, Congreve spoke to one of the
powder makers, John Munns, and asked him why his powder grains had
degenerated virtually immediately after passing proof. Munns replied
that he had not made it to keep, merely to make it stong. Munns had a
point: from the manufacturer's point of view, provided the powder
passed proof, he was paid for it, and that was the end of the matter;
what happened thereafter was not his concern. However, it was very much the concern of the Board of Ordnance: this lack of durability was one of the major problems. Having experimented further, Congreve found that the fault lay in the manufacture. When powder was made it was pressed into cake, and then broken up into grains. The crucial factor was the pressure used to form it into cake: If too little pressure was used,
the powder could be grained, but it did not achieve homogeneity, and
thus began to degenerate almost immediately. What was needed was an
improved method of manufacture, and this could only be achieved by the
Board having a greater rather than a lesser part in powder making."

"Congreve also found that various woods in charcoal had different
characteristics, and concluded that dogwood was best, followed by
willow. In 1785 he had a considerable correspondence on the subject
with Richard Watson, who recommended that the charcoal be prepared in
cylinders, a system invented by a Dr. Fordyce and developed by Watson.
Following comparative experiments with this "cylinder charcoal",
standard pit charcoal, and an alternative variety peculiar to the powder
makers of Battle in Sussex, in which the charcoal was charred in pots,
Congreve confirmed that Watson's cylinder charcoal was best."

"While the durability of the grain was clearly of major importance,
Congreve found that size was also a crucial factor; he seems to have
been influenced by Benjamin Thompson (subsequently Count Rumsford) and J. Ingenhousz. Ingenhousz read a paper before the Royal Society in 1779 in which he established the precise role of each of the three constituents of gunpowder, and proved that grain size was the controlling factor in the size of inflammation of powder, from which it followed that grain size had to be proportional to the size of the gun. Thompson established in 1781 ("New Experiments of Gunpowder", Phil. Trans. Royal Society, 1781), that not only did compression have a major effect on powder quality, but that both gun temperature and charge temperature were also key factors, all of which had major implications for the proof system. Congreve established for himself that grain shape also had an effect: that the area of burning surface relative to the mass of the grain affected the rate of inflammation, so that "flake" powder burned faster than spherical grain; however, predictability depended on the
shape of the flake being regular, a development which at the time could
not be consistently achieved."

"Thompson also proved that the current method of proof, involving the vertical eprouvette, were totally unreliable, resulting not only in bad
powder being passed but in good powder being rejected. This agreed
with both Robins' and Hutton's observations, and were confirmed by
Congreve's own experiments. An experiment in 1780 at Faversham had
suggested that the French method of proof, using an eprouvette mortar, a standard quantity of powder, and a standard projectile (PRO WO 47-96)
was superior, and this was the method established by Congreve.
Eprouvette mortars can still be seen in situ in England."

Click to expand...

"There was also considerable doubt about the refining of saltpetre.
The saltpetre received by the Board [Board of Ordnance] from the East
India Company was in a partially-refined state known as "grough"
saltpetre. This had always been regarded as 15% impure, for as long as
anyone could remember, and may well have dated back to the original
arrangement with the E.I.C. in 1620, when the ability to refine was far
less developed. Using more modern [i.e. late 18th century] methods,
Congreve found that it was only 10% impure. However, the Board handed it over to the makers on the 15% basis to make 80% saltpetre powder. Congreve immediately smelt a large rat, and analyzed the result. He found that in any case the makers reduced the saltpetre content to
74.5%, and moreover the saltpetre was still in the partially refined
state in which it had been handed over. The powder makers had simply
neglected to perform their contractual obligation to refine it. This
meant an illegal profit of 20 lbs of saltpetre per 100 lbs received,
which during the Seven Years War had given an annual profit to the
makers of 100 tons. At the then current prices, this amounted to no
less than £8,000, a not inconsiderable sum.

"In the course of his investigations, Congreve uncovered a further
swindle. in connection with condemned powder. When powder was condemned on being landed by ships being de-commissioned, it was sold to the powder makers by the Board so that the saltpetre could be extracted and used again. The same system operated for captured powder. The Board allowed for a loss in extraction of 10 lbs of saltpetre per barrel. However, according to Congreve, the cost of the extraction added to the price of the condemned powder, which was in the region of 55 shillings, was more than the cost of the saltpetre on the open market, and on the face of it the whole operation was uneconomic. Congreve therefore surmised that some other financially rewarding prospect must present itself, since between 1771 and 1779 the powder makers had bought no less than 19,000 barrels of condemned powder. It turned out that the financially rewarding prospect in question was the export market."

"The export market was largely at the mercy of the government. During the Seven Years War, when there was a major shortage of gunpowder, the civilian export trade was prohibited, but by the American War of 1775 the position had reversed itself, and there was then a government subsidy of 4s 6d on each exported barrel of English gunpowder, payable on a mere declaration that the powder was English. This seems to have been an attempt to ensure that the Germanic states who were allied to England had an adequate supply. The export price was 83s 10d, which meant that the powder makers could buy at 55s 6d and sell at 87s 10d, giving a gross profit of 32s 4d; allowing for overheads, this gave a net profit in the region of 30 shillings per barrel."

"Congreve quoted the case of a Mr. Hill, who was probably Edmund Hill of the Hounslow Mills in Middlesex, who apparently bought 5,150 barrels of condemned captured foreign powder from the Board of Ordnance at 37 shillings a barrel, and then exported it as English powder. Allowing for the subsidy, this gave him a profit of 50s 10d per barrel, in all £12,989 11s 8d. This, in 1783, would have purchased a substantial
country estate, and if this was the profit on a single illegal transaction it suggests an extremely worthwhile practice. Since Congreve made the statement in print, if untrue it was a gross libel, but Mr. Hill did not sue, so that it would appear that Congreve was correct."

"After carrying out his experiments, and determining on cylinder
powder, Congreve addressed himself to the question of the Faversham
mills, and calculated that, by improving the manufacture and using
cylinder charcoal, charges could be reduced and money actually saved.
He costed the savings at £1,045,494 10s 6-1/4d, which is probably the
source of the remark in his epitaph that 'he saved his country a million
of money, but died unenriched himself'..... The result of his calculations was that not only was Faversham Mill retained by the Board, but that in 1787 arrangements were commenced to buy Waltham Abbey Mill from the Walton family; purchase seems to have been completed by the end
of 1788..... Congreve went on to invent a new method of refining
saltpetre in 1784, and of melting it and casting it in cakes in 1787 (W.
Congreve, Laboratory Papers, Manuscript, R.A. Library). He became
Inspector of Gunpowder Manufactories in 1789, was knighted in 1812, and died on 30 April 1814."

"Congreve instituted a three-tier powder system. Cylinder powder, both large and small grain was denoted first grade and marked in red; pit and pot powder was second grade and marked in blue; and restored powder was classed as third grade and marked in black. Further classification was to follow: on 11 June 1790, the Board of Ordnance issued a new 'Regulation for the Supply of H.M.'s Navy with Gunpowder' (Notes on Artillery, A.S. Frazer, manuscript, R.A. Library). This stated that there were three sorts of King's Powder: LG in red denoted a very strong powder; LG in blue, one that was uniform and very durable; and LG in white was one which was stronger than blue but liable to grow dusty. The Regulation went on to say that one third of a ship's powder was to be made at the King's Mills, one third made by merchants, dusted and restored, and one third made by merchants 'such as was used during the last [war] 1783' Ships stored [being supplied] for foreign service were to have two thirds of their powder from the King's Mills and one third merchants' dusted and restored. The Regulation concluded with the recommendation 'to the Captains of HM Navy to use in general the powder made by the Merchants first and to economize that made at the King's Mills as much as they can'."

"Cylinder powder seems to have worked its way to the top of the issue list by 1792, when it was being used for proof (H. A. Baker, 'The Crisis in Naval Ordnance', Monograph No. 56, NMM, 1983). This meant that at the start of the French Revolutionary War in February 1793, the Royal Navy had a durable, reliable, and more powerful propellant for its guns; this is Congreve's best epitaph. However, it was kept in reserve and not generally issued until 1801 (PRO ADM 7/677)."

Click to expand...

"We at Hodgdon would not recommend using smokeless powder in a duplex load with any muzzleloading propellant."

Click to expand...